Sacramento Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

The Simmons court eloquently stated its rationale behind its holding: Under the facts of this case, we declined to establish a more lenient standard of causation. To do so, would be contrary to sound logic, legal precedent and public policy. It would unwisely encourage costly and unreasonable over-testing and over-treatment for defensive purposes. Physicians would find it necessary to place the requirements of the legal system before the need and the finances of the patient. In addition, the physicians' increased exposure to liability would adversely impact already high medical malpractice premiums, resulting in an upward spiral of consumer costs. The uncertainty fostered by such a ruling would undoubtedly open the proverbial flood gates of our overburdened judicial system. Id. at 705-706.

Likewise, in Jennings v. Palomar (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, the Court held that proof that a negligent act was a substantial factor in causing the injury to plaintiff did not relieve plaintiff from the burden of proving defendant's negligence was the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury. Therefore, although Plaintiff need not eliminate any possibility that Defendants' conduct was not a cause of Plaintiff's injury, she must introduce evidence from which reasonable people may conclude that it is more probable than not that the her alleged injury of Complex Regional Pain Syndrome was caused by the Defendants.

Continue reading " Sacramento Woman's Hand Surgery Negligently Performed, Part 4 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

The court very effectively discusses the proximate causation requirement which Plaintiffs must meet: We find persuasive on this issue the following discretion and standard from Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, as set forth in the brief of respondents:

Traditional proximate cause standards require that the trier of facts, at a minimum, must be provided with evidence that a result was more likely than not to have been caused by an act in the absence of any intervening cause. Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice cases where physical well-being and life itself are subject to litigation. The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward a conclusion that an action for wrongful death, an injured person would be compensated for the loss of any chance of survival regardless of the remoteness.

However, we have trepidations that such a rule would be so loose, that it would produce more injustice than justice. Even though there exists authority for a rule allowing recovery based on proof of causation by evidence not meeting the standard for probability, we are not persuaded by their logic ... we consider the better rule to be that in order to comport with the standard of proof and proximate cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case must prove that defendant's negligence, and probability, proximately caused the damages.

Continue reading " Physicians From Sacramento Hospital Mishandle Surgery, Part 3 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this vehicle accident/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

CAUSATION MUST BE PROVEN WITHIN A REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY

As the court is aware, in personal injury cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's culpable conduct was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. "Proximate" or "legal" cause adds to the requirement that the defendant's culpable conduct be the actual cause of the plaintiff's injury. Accordingly, the Plaintiff should be precluded from recovery when the causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury does not justify imposing tort responsibility on the defendant.

To that end, the law in this state is well settled that in a personal injury action, causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396,402. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 403. To that end, there can be an infinite number of causes and circumstances which can produce injury or disease, however, a possible cause only becomes probable when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of Defendants' action. Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487.

Continue reading " Sacramento Doctors Sued For Malpractice After Surgery, Part 2 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Defendants, The Surgery Center, PC., and Ellen Brown, O.T.R., submit the following trial brief on causation in support of Defendants' proposed special jury instructions.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

This is a medical negligence action in which Plaintiff alleges negligent treatment by Defendants during hand therapy following repair of a distal radius fracture of the left wrist resulting in Plaintiff's Complex Regional Pain Syndrome.

As the Court is aware, in medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must establish each of the following basic elements:
(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as any other member of her/its profession commonly possess and exercises;
(2) a breach of that duty;

Continue reading " Sacramento Woman Sues For Medical Malpractice After Negligent Hand Surgery, Part 1 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice/brain injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

In Burciaga, the Court first determined that an emergency situation, as envisioned by § 2395, existed, as the newborn was in respiratory distress and in need of emergent care. Burciaga, supra, at 714. Next, the Court stated that, unlike other Good Samaritan statutes, California's Good Samaritan Law applies to emergencies both within and without a hospital. Burciaga, supra, at 715-716. Further, §§ 2395 and 2396 are not limit[ed] to only those physicians treating patients outside the scope of the physicians' specialties. Burciaga, supra, at 716. The heart of the application of the Good Samaritan statutes is the inquiry whether a duty of professional care pre-existed the emergency. Burciaga, supra, at 716. The Court concluded that defendant pediatrician owed no duty to the plaintiff newborn as he was not the pediatrician's patient, and his obstetrician did not regularly refer patients to defendant pediatrician.

In the instant case, Dr. White was called by plaintiff Amy Brown's obstetrician to emergently treat her following delivery. At that time, Amy Brown was blue and not breathing, and in obvious respiratory distress. As such, an emergency existed. Further, plaintiff Amy Brown was not Dr. White's patient, nor had he ever treated her before. Dr. White was only available to treat plaintiff Amy Brown because he was present at XYZ Hospital treating his own patients. Thus, Dr. White's treatment of plaintiff Amy Brown falls squarely within the bounds of the Good Samaritan Defense. As such, Dr. White cannot be liable for plaintiffs' damages.

Accordingly, defendant Stuart White, M.D., is entitled to summary judgment.

Continue reading " Brain Injury Of Sacramento Child Due To Medical Negligence, Part 9 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

Similarly, California Business & Professions Code § 2396 provides:
No licensee, who in good faith upon the request of another person so licensed, renders emergency medical care to a person for medical complication arising from prior care by another person so licensed, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such licensed person in rendering such emergency medical care.

In Perkins v. Howard, 232 Cal.App.3d 708 (1991), the Court stated that the plain intent of the Good Samaritan Law is to encourage physicians to respond to requests for aid in medical emergencies, and thereby provide medical care to those who might not otherwise receive it. In Bryant v. Bakshandeh, 226 Cal.App.3d1241 (1991), the Court defined emergency as the existence of an exigency of so pressing a character that some kind of action must be taken.

In McKenna v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, 93 Cal.App.3d 282 (1979), the decedent's family filed an action against defendant doctor, who had provided emergency medical care to the decedent. The decedent was not a patient of defendant doctor, nor was defendant doctor otherwise involved with the decedent's medical care. The Court held that California's Good Samaritan Law (then § 2144, now §§ 2395 and 2396) applied to medical emergencies in hospitals the same way it did to medical emergencies elsewhere. In so holding, the Court stated that a licensed physician, who in good faith rendered emergency medical care at the scene of an emergency, was not liable for any civil damages that resulted from any acts or omissions in rendering such care. McKenna, supra, at 288.

Continue reading " Child Suffers Birth Injuries At Sacramento Hospital, Part 8 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice/brain injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. White committed professional negligence in and around May 25, 1999, at co-defendant XYZ Hospital, by failing to timely diagnose and treat plaintiff Amy Brown respiratory difficulties, causing her to suffer further hypoxic brain injury. However, plaintiffs cannot produce any competent medical testimony to substantiate that allegation.

As stated in his declaration, Dr. White timely determined that Amy Brown's endotracheal tube was obstructed, and re-intubated her appropriately. Further, Dr. White's determination that Amy Brown's ventilator was potentially malfunctioning, and subsequent replacement of said ventilator, was performed in a timely manner and appropriately. As set forth in Dr. White's declaration, his care and treatment of plaintiff Amy Brown in no way, caused or contributed to plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, if plaintiffs cannot provide expert support to substantiate their allegation that defendant actually caused their alleged injuries and damages, their action must fail.

Continue reading " Family From Sacramento Sues Hospital for Birth Injuries, Part 7 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

PLAINTIFF MUST PRESENT AFFIDAVITS OR DECLARATIONS OF COMPETENT EXPERTS TO AVOID THE GRANTING OF THIS MOTION

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish the necessary elements of his or her case; that is, that the defendant's act or omission fell below the applicable standard of practice, and that this substandard care caused the plaintiff injury. Folk v. Kilt (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d at 176 [126 Cal.Rptr. 172]. Accordingly, plaintiff must come forward with admissible evidence, by a competent qualified physician, that the care and treatment rendered by the moving defendant fell below the applicable standard of care and actually caused plaintiff's injuries and damages. (Folk, supra, at page 176.) Absent such evidence, there is no triable issue as to any material fact.

THE CARE RENDERED BY DEFENDANT IN NO WAY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE INJURIES COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF

In addition to proving that the defendant fell below the standard of care, to prevail on any medical negligence claimed, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's malpractice caused injury to the plaintiff. Bolen v. Woo (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 944, 953.

Continue reading " Doctors Sued For Malpractice After Birth Injuries, Part 6 of 9 " »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice/birth injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINE LIABILITY IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION
In a medical malpractice action, the requisite standard of care is determined by the applicable standard of care then existing in the particular professional community. Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 484, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494. In Linderos v. Flood (1976) 170 Cal.3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal.Rptr. 69, the Supreme Court determined that the standard of care against which the acts of physicians are measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts and can only be proven by their testimony. The rationale for requiring expert testimony in medical malpractice actions was succinctly stated by the court in Barton:

In most instances there is a need for expert testimony on the subject of just what constitutes medical negligence, because the average judge or juror does not possess the necessary level of knowledge about medical malpractice to decide on its own whether the doctor was negligent. Barton at 494, 139 Cal.Rptr. at 499.

The role of expert testimony in a medical malpractice action was explained in Willard v. Hagenmeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 175 Cal.Rptr. 365. In Willard, the court was called upon to review the granting of a summary judgment motion in favor of the defendant dentist, where defendants secured declarations of experts to support his motion for summary judgment. In describing the weight to be given such expert testimony, the court stated:

Continue reading " Child From Sacramento Suffers Brain Injury During Birth, Part 5 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that medical malpractice situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN NO TRIABLE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACTS EXIST

It is well-established that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the moving party demonstrates that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c). In making this determination, the court may rely on affidavits, declarations ... and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken. Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(b).

The summary judgment statute was revised as of January 1, 1993, and now specifies that a party bringing a motion for summary judgment need only establish a defense or only negate a necessary element of the challenged cause of action to justify entry of summary judgment. Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(n); cf. Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1050. Under this new standard, once the moving party has met its burden of negating one necessary element of a claim, the opposing party must then show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the questioned cause of action, or summary judgment shall be granted. Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(n)(2).

Continue reading " Medical Malpractice By Sacramento Physicians Causes Brain Injury, Part 4 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 25, 1999, plaintiff Tina Brown presented to co-defendant XYZ Hospital for the anticipated delivery of her child. Prior to and during, her delivery, Tina Brown was treated and cared for by co-defendant James Lee, M.D. Tina Brown was not Dr. White's patient, nor had he ever treated her before.

Approximately twenty minutes after the Cesarean-section delivery of minor plaintiff Amy Brown, Dr. White, a neonatologist, was called and told to emergently examine Amy Brown. Amy Brown was not Dr. White's patient, nor had he ever treated her before. When Dr. White first examined Amy Brown, she was cyanotic, and her chest was not rising well during respiration. At that time, Dr. White determined that her endotracheal tube might be obstructed. As such, Dr. White re-intubated Amy Brown with a new and larger endotracheal tube.

Subsequently, upon determining that Amy Brown's condition was not improving adequately, Dr. White determined by a matter of elimination that in all probability her ventilator was malfunctioning. Consequently, Dr. White replaced the ventilator with another ventilator.

Continue reading " Doctors From Sacramento Commit Malpractice, Part 3 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this wrongful death/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

INTRODUCTION

This medical malpractice action against Defendant Stuart White, M.D. arises out of his care and treatment of minor plaintiff Amy Brown in and around May 25, 1999, at co-defendant XYZ Hospital. On August 16, 2000, plaintiffs filed their Complaint, and on December 21, 2000, they filed their First Amended Complaint. On November 14, 2002, plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was amended adding Dr. White as a Doe defendant. On December 5, 2002, Dr. White was served with a Summons on the Amended First Amended Complaint.

On May 25, 1999, Dr. White was called to XYZ Hospital for emergency neonatal care of plaintiff Amy Brown. Neither plaintiff Amy Brown, nor her mother, plaintiff Tina Brown, were the patient of Dr. White, nor had he ever treated either of them before. Further, Dr. White only treated plaintiff Amy Brown at XYZ Hospital on May 25, 1999. In their Complaint, plaintiffs essentially allege that Dr. White failed to timely diagnose and treat plaintiff Amy Brown’s respiratory difficulties, causing her to suffer further hypoxic brain injury.

Continue reading " Sacramento Hospital Causes Child's Brain Injury, Part 2 of 9 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

This Motion For Summary Judgment will be made upon the grounds that there are no triable issues of material fact in this action in that the medical care and treatment rendered by defendant Stuart White, M.D. to minor plaintiff Amy Brown complied, at all times, with the applicable standard of care. Moreover, the care and treatment provided by defendant in no way caused or contributed to plaintiffs' alleged injuries and damages.

In addition, defendant provided emergent treatment to plaintiff Amy Brown, at the scene of the emergency at the defendant hospital. As such, defendant cannot be liable for plaintiffs' damages pursuant to California's Good Samaritan Law, California Business & Professions Code § 2395 and § 2396.

Continue reading " Sacramento Family Sues For Child's Birth Injuries, Part 1 of 9 " »